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Abstract 
 
The 2010 explosion of BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil rig was an environmental disaster 
unparalleled in United States history. Because of this, there has been a great deal of research 
studies regarding the matter.  
The purpose of this study was to determine what inshore fishing guides in the Tampa Bay 
Area feel should be a response to future oil spills using Image Repair Theory, as well as how this 
important group of stakeholders felt about the image repair responses employed by BP in the 
wake of the spill.  
In depth interviews were used to gather data and answer the pertinent research questions, 
which also generated follow up questions. The findings showed Tampa Bay Area captains feel 
that BP’s responses in the wake of the spill were inadequate in alleviating the situation. The 
captains felt that better planning on the part of oil companies is needed and also that oil 
companies should be mortified and have clear and decisive plans for correcting the situation as 
well as alleviating the effects of said spill on the pertinent publics. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
Introduction 
 
Thesis Statement  
 
The purpose of this study was to gain an understanding of what inshore fishing guides in 
Tampa Bay feel should be a response to oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico under the guise of Image 
Repair Theory. Another purpose of this study was to gauge the captains’ perceptions and 
responses/thoughts regarding the image repair strategies that were employed by BP following the 
Deepwater Horizon spill. These goals were accomplished by conducting in depth interviews.  
Of all the research that currently exists regarding the Deepwater Horizon spill, charter 
fishing guides have not been represented at all. Charter captains can spend up to 300 days a year 
on the water, while they don’t necessarily hold scientific knowledge; they are very in tune with 
the happenings of the waters that they fish. The lack of representation this public has in the 
current body of research is folly on the part of published social science researchers.  
The study uses Image Repair Theory as a lens to examine the responses of the given 
population; this theory has never been applied to this population before. The data that the 
populations that are being examined provided the primary investigator with could conceptually 
provide practical information to be referenced for future responses to such occurrences. Not only 
could the findings be helpful to organizations in crisis (Image Repair Theory is practically a 
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guide book for an organization in crisis), but it could also help bystanders impacted by the event 
and in the case of an oil spill, the environment.   The study didn’t make claims or hypotheses, it 
didn’t aim to make any sort of broad changes; it merely provided information that was 
previously unavailable. The responses to the research questions that the selected sample provided 
could hold significant weight as guides are the eyes and ears on the water, therefor the results of 
this study could conceptually help shape future public policy if policy makers were to reference 
this study and decided to take this research and this public into account in the event of another oil 
spill.  
The population that was examined in this study is not only influential, but represents a 
major part of Florida’s economy and identity. Florida is a peninsula; it is no secret that many 
people make their livings on the water because of this. Even those who don’t work on the water 
can be impacted by things that may happen to the water (fish kills, algae blooms, dangerous 
wildlife, floods, etc.) many people also choose to spend leisure time on the water as well.  
Florida was a state that was impacted in various ways by the Deepwater Horizon spill (which 
was also the worst accidental spill ever in the U.S.). The actual population will be discussed in 
more detail in the forthcoming sections.  
In short, this study filled in a gap in the existing research regarding the Deepwater 
Horizon spill by examining an underrepresented group of influential stakeholders which were 
impacted by the event and BP’s associated responses. If policy makers were to read this study it 
could help to shape future responses and strategies in the wake of oil spills because of the 
influence of the effected publics and their take on the events (in depth discussion available in 
results and discussion sections). The study did this under the guise of Image Repair Theory. All 
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of the associated details with what was discussed in this first chapter can be found in the 
following chapter.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
Literature Review 
Background  
On April 20, 2010, the offshore oil rig, Deepwater Horizon exploded causing the largest 
oil spill ever in U.S. waters. Federal officials estimated that over 84 days, more than 200 million 
gallons or 4.9 million barrels of crude oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico (Ramseur, 2010). The 
spill affected more than 600 miles along the coasts of various states on the Gulf of Mexico, 
including Florida, Alabama, Louisiana and Texas (Grattan et al., 2011). In the aftermath of the 
spill, British Petroleum, who owned the rig, made use of many different tactics to clean up the oil 
as well as to minimize the overall environmental damages. The physical response strategies are 
listed as follows: it’s estimated that three percent was skimmed, five percent was burned, eight 
percent was chemically dispersed, 16 percent was naturally dispersed, 17 percent was captured, 
25 percent was evaporated or dissolved and 26 percent was remaining (Atlas & Hazen, 2011). 
Skimming and burning were tactics employed in the 1993 oil spill that resulted from the freighter 
Balsa 37 colliding with two inbound barge-tug combinations in Tampa’s main shipping channel 
(Galt, LaBelle, McGrattan & Tennyson, 1994).While some of BP’s tactics had been used before 
and were somewhat mainstream, the use of chemical dispersants proved to be a controversial 
move. Another tactic that was also used with some degree of success in protecting coastal 
shorelines was booms (Levy & Gopalakrishnan, 2010).  
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The Deepwater Horizon will go down as one of the all-time worst environmental 
disasters. In the end the total costs of the spill were unlike anything ever previously seen. Total 
damages to BP, the environment and the U.S. Gulf Coast economy were estimated to be $36.9 
billion (Smith, Smith, & Ashcroft, 2011). Not only was there enormous environmental and 
economic damage, there were also deaths that resulted from the explosion. The explosion of the 
instillation resulted in the deaths of 11 people (Liu, Weisberg, Hu & Zheng, 2011).  
Image Repair Theory  
Being responsible for an oil spill that dwarfed the infamous Exxon Valdez spill is 
something that BP did not take lightly. BP employed a variety of image repair strategies to deal 
with the public relations nightmare that the spill caused.  
Image Repair Theory was developed by William Benoit to help understand how 
organizations and individuals respond to crises, the theory is based around two key assumptions, 
the first being that someone accuses an organization or individual as being responsible for a 
particular action or situation, and the second is that the action in question is offensive or harmful 
(Liu & Fraustino, 2014). A solidly constructed image has elements that enhance an organization 
or individual's ability to project a perception of power, character, trust, leadership and name 
recognition (Moody, 2011). Under Benoit’s Image Repair Theory, there are five primary 
strategies: denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action and 
mortification (Compton, 2016). These five strategies will be discussed further in the measures 
section.  
Image Repair Theory can almost be thought of as a self-help manual or a roadmap back 
to good standing for organizations facing crises. Throughout its development, Image Repair 
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Theory has been used exclusively as a retrospective framework. This means that those who have 
used the theory have applied it to understand particular cases of corporate communications by 
looking back on what happened and why. This makes sense given the tenants that categorize the 
theory itself. Sometimes, suggestions are also made about what could have been done better or 
what generally can be done by others facing similar circumstances.” (Smudde & Courtright, 
2008).   
In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon, BP’s strategies centered on describing and 
delineating what they were doing to correct the problem and compensating the victims, but it did 
not include strategies such as shifting the blame to the other parties nor did it include admitting 
their own blame (Harlow, Brantley & Harlow, 2011).   
Results of a content analysis showed that the use of corrective action was the 
predominant image restoration strategy BP chose to use in their Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and 
Flickr pages (Muralidharan, Dillistone & Shin, 2011).  This echoed the findings presented by 
Harlow and Brantley (2011). Specifically, in the Facebook posts that BP used, they focused on 
information giving, letting the public know what was being done to fix the spill and trying to 
generate positive comments and engagement from those affected by the spill. “Information 
giving strategies dominated BP’s crisis response, and Facebook users were more likely to 
comment favorably when BP used information giving strategies and accommodative strategies. 
Bolstering strategies and third-party endorsement did not achieve anticipated effectiveness” (Lan 
Ye & Eyun-Jung, 2017).  
 In regard to the payouts from the spill to those individuals and businesses impacted by 
the spill BP paid out $20 billion to those impacted by the spill (Sole, 2011). The payouts and 
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corrective actions associated with the spill was a major topic of discussion with the participants 
of this study. Corrective action is a statement that expresses a commitment to repair the damage 
from said offensive act. Corrective action can take two forms. The rhetorician can make a 
promise to restore things to before the offensive act or they can promise to prevent any new 
recurrences of the act” (Benoit, 2014) (P. 735).  
There was a study conducted by Joy Smithson and Steven Venette (2013) that brought to 
light an image repair strategy that had previously gone uncatalogued, specifically in BP’s 
congressional testimonies. Analysis of the testimony revealed a previously unidentified image-
defense strategy, labeled here as stonewalling. This tactic redirected the audience’s attention to 
miniscule and unimportant details, which enabled BP to temporarily prevent further damage to 
the company’s image (Smithson & Venette, 2013).  
In an article published earlier this year, entitled, The BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill: 
Exploring the link between social and environmental disclosures and reputation risk 
management present findings which Arora and Lodhia concur with the Smithson and Venette 
study. “The company was engrossed in providing accounts of its world class facilities and 
superior quality of management, diverting attention away from the severe environmental damage 
caused by the massive oil spill” (Arora & Lodhia, 2017). While the article doesn’t detail 
unimportant details that the Smithson and Venette study discussed, it does bring up that BP tried 
to draw attention away from some aspects of the spill and to get people to focus on other things.  
The article also supports Lan Ye  and Eyun-Jung ‘s 2017 article which was previously mentioned 
in the aspect that information giving was a huge part of BP’s response strategy. 
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Uses of Image Repair Theory  
There are abundant examples of Image Repair Theory being used during times of crisis; it 
has been used by both individuals and organizations. One example was President Barack Obama 
after the rollout of the Affordable Care Act and all of the issues associated with it. Having 
accepted responsibility for these problems, the President’s defense proposed corrective action to 
fix the situation. He declared that “problem number one [is] making sure that the website works 
the way it's supposed to … [W]e’re working 24/7 to get it working for the vast majority of 
Americans in a smooth, consistent way”. “My pledge to the American people is that we’re going 
to solve the problems that are there, we’re going to get it right, and the Affordable Care Act is 
going to work for the American people” (Benoit, 2014) (P. 735).  
Another instance of Image Repair Theory being used successfully was in the case of 
Duke Lacrosse. In 2006, members of the Duke men’s lacrosse team were accused of sexual 
assault. Courts would eventually clear the players of all charges, but despite this, Duke had to 
employ image repair strategies to protect their image. “Of these strategies, corrective action was 
used the most. Initial corrective action messages concerned the lacrosse team and its forfeiture of 
two games. Later, the university president announced the decision to suspend the season. Not 
only was the president taking action by punishing the lacrosse players, but he also indicated that 
the coach would be replaced. The clear implication was that a new coach may “correct” any 
problems within the lacrosse team that the previous coach may have been responsible for”. (Len-
Ríos, 2010) (P. 277).  
In the introduction, the possibility of the results of this study being influential in future 
policies was discussed. This study doesn’t directly aim to change any existing policies of 
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governmental or non-governmental parties; conceptually if this study made it in front of the right 
eyes it could be influential. The sexual assault cases at the United States Air Force Academy in 
the early 2000s are an example of Image Repair Theory being used, with changes in policy that 
went along with it as a result.  
In January of 2003, female cadets began coming forward and contacting members of 
Congress with reports of sexual assault and indifference from commanders, investigations would 
reveal 142 allegations of sexual assault dating as far back as 1993 (Holtzhausen & Roberts, 
2009). According to anonymous surveys regarding the climate of the academy (a standard 
practice), cadets felt that there was a sexual assault problem at the academy and even 20 percent 
of male cadets didn’t believe women belonged in the academy (Holtzhausen & Roberts, 2009).  
The Pentagon, Congress and Air Force brass had got involved and the entire situation was an 
embarrassment to the Air Force.  
In March 2003, the Secretary of the Air Force, a civilian appointed by the President of the 
United States and charged with oversight of the entire U.S. Air Force, and the Chief of Staff, the 
service’s highest ranking military officer, replaced the four top academy leaders and drew up 
new institutional policies. They called it the “Agenda for Change,” and it addressed leadership, 
cadet life and the broader academy climate (Holtzhausen & Roberts, 2009).  Not only was there 
corrective action of removing key individuals from positions of power at the academy, but there 
was a policy change, the “Agenda for Change”.  
This wasn’t the only time that image repair strategies resulted in policy changes. The 
early 2000s also saw China in hot water, as their exports to countries around the world came 
under scrutiny for being hazardous. Denial was a common image repair strategy utilized when it 
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tried to diffuse criticisms. In the days following the US pet food recall, for instance, China 
denied that grain protein products caused the spate of pet deaths. More criticisms followed 
ranging from tires to toothpaste, from places ranging from the United States to New Zealand 
(Peijuan, Pei & Pang, 2009).  
China couldn’t deny everything or shift the blame forever; eventually they had to use 
corrective action, which also included policy changes overall. At the national level, a four-month 
campaign was launched to improve product and food safety. Through these measures, the 
Chinese government promised that there would not be any uncertified producer by 2012.  
Besides instituting massive reforms internally, China also established mechanisms with its 
trading partners to ensure food safety (Peijuan, Pei & Pang, 2009).  
There are many other examples of policy changes resulting from Image Repair Theory 
and a crisis. The previously mentioned examples show how important Image Repair Theory can 
be as it changed practices in the United States Air Force, a massive and powerful entity, and in 
the country of China, a world power. 
Philosophical Assumptions  
Aside from Image Repair Theory, there are other factors that shaped the direction of this 
study. The philosophical assumptions of the primary investigator helped to direct the path of how 
the research was conducted. In this section, epistemology, ontology and axiology are defined and 
the specific philosophical beliefs of the primary investigator are also discussed.  
Ontology relates to the nature of reality and its characteristics, reality are multiple as seen 
through many views. Epistemology entails researchers getting as close as possible to the 
participants being studied. The researcher attempts to lessen the distance between themselves 
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and that being researched. Axiology involves the researcher bringing his own values into a study; 
the researcher acknowledges that research is value laden and that biases are present (Cresswell, 
2013).  
Epistemology can also be thought of as the questions, “how do we know the world?” or 
“what is the relationship between the inquirer and the known?” (Brennen, 2017). Ontology raises 
basic questions about the nature of reality (Brennen, 2017).   
The ontological perspective of the primary researcher was that the specific public that 
was under investigation in this study could offer a unique perspective. Specifically, the primary 
researcher felt that the reality of the given public as it pertains to the Deepwater Horizon incident 
may be different than the reality of other groups and publics because they lived through it and 
had it directly impact their lives. 
Given that the primary investigator was driven by his ontological philosophical 
perspective it lead to the belief on the part of the primary investigator that in depth interviews 
were the best approach to collect the pertinent data. The group that was studied is 
underrepresented in the current research, therefore, their reality may be unique and not one that 
is currently known and understood. Interviews were the best way to discover this information.  
Populations 
The body of research regarding the Deepwater Horizon spill is extensive. There is a great 
deal of scientific research papers discussing how everything from ocean sediments to plants and 
animals were impacted by the spill – the biological implications. There are also a large number 
of social science papers that discuss the human aspect of the spill. For example, a marketing 
research company commissioned by the Louisiana Seafood Promotion Board reported that 70 
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percent of consumers polled expressed at least some level of concern about seafood safety 
following the Gulf oil spill, and 23 percent had reduced their consumption of seafood during that 
time. The study implied that consumer concerns with safety had caused a decrease in demand for 
Gulf seafood and seafood in general (Upton, 2011). This phenomenon was supported by the 
2016 study, Measuring the Impact of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill on Consumer 
Behavior. According to the study, “the BP spill had a negative impact on oyster demand in terms 
of short-run actual behavior, although spill effects show signs of dissipating several months 
following the spill” (Morgan, Whitehead, Huth, Martin & Sjolander, 2016). Additionally, the 
study also revealed that short and long term spill responses differed across consumer groups.  
Aside from consumer behaviors, there is research on other stakeholders such as 
commercial and recreational fisherman. The same 2011 study by Upton found that recreational 
fishing also makes significant contributions to the region’s economy by supporting businesses 
such as charters (guides), bait and tackle shops, restaurants and lodging. In 2008, 5.7 million 
Gulf recreational fishermen, both visitors and residents, took 24 million fishing trips. In 2008, 
recreational fishermen spent over $12.5 billion on durable equipment and trips in the Gulf 
region.  
In Florida, recreational saltwater fishing generates $7.6 billion dollars per year and 
supports 109,341 jobs (Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, 2014). From sales 
of Florida fishing licenses alone, $35,528,631 in revenues was generated in fiscal year 2013/14 
(Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, 2016). It was because of this that this 
population is so important. Recreational fishing has a huge impact on the state of Florida, and 
this very specific group of stakeholders that hasn’t yet been studied. There were two research 
questions in this survey: 
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RQ1: How do the participants regard BP’s response strategies used in the aftermath of the 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill? 
RQ2: What response strategies do participants feel should be used in future spills? 
Through the gathering of empirical data, this study took the already extensive body of 
research regarding the Deep Water Horizon oil spill in a new direction under the guise of Image 
Repair Theory. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
Method 
Participants  
Participants included 11 inshore charter fishing captains in the Tampa Bay Area spanning 
from Dunedin and Clearwater to Tampa Bay. Participants were recruited via convenience 
sampling; the primary investigator has been a part of the fishing industry for many years and had 
ready access to the participants. The participants in question had over 100 years of experience as 
guides and had been fishing recreationally for nearly their entire lives. In terms of demographics, 
the participants were all white males that all spanned the age categories from 18 to 24 to over 55.  
Procedure 
The study was approved by the USF Institutional Review Board (IRB). The locations for 
each interview were selected by coordinating with each subject to find a mutually agreeable 
setting for the interview. Interview sites were evaluated by proximity to each party, comfort level 
for each individual and seclusion/noise level in order to facilitate the best recording conditions. 
Upon meeting at an agreed on location, before the interview commenced, there was small 
talk between the primary investigator and the participants. The small talk served to relax the 
subject and help them to feel comfortable; during this time each party also had the opportunity to 
order food. All the participants signed an informed consent sheet for the study as well as for 
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being audio recorded which was explained thoroughly by the primary investigator who also 
answered any questions the participants had.  
After the aforementioned process was completed, the primary investigator began the 
interview. In depth interviews that lasted at least an hour but not longer than two hours were 
conducted and recorded by the primary investigator on a cell phone recording app. There were 
four primary questions (these questions are listed in the measures section) in the interviews 
which also yielded follow up questions. The primary investigator let each participant talk and 
divulge into various areas and opinions/thoughts, but was mindful to keep the overall 
conversation on track and related to the Deepwater Horizon and the aftermath thereof. If the 
participant ordered food or drinks or wanted to use the bathroom facilities at the location, breaks 
were allotted for those purposes. Most of the interviews conducted in this research study 
consisted of at least one break.  
Upon completion of the interview, the primary investigator thanked the participants for 
sharing their time and answering the questions provided. Later the primary researcher transcribed 
the responses, which can be found in the results section. The transcribed interviews were coded 
by the primary researcher using a code book available in the appendix section.  Codes were 
created by finding a generalizable trend first or sequence of themes that consistently fell in line 
with one of the image repair strategies, for example not being truly regretful would fall under the 
mortification strategy. After the generalizable trend was identified, a more in depth explanation 
of what the trend was and meant was deduced. Finally, the actual quote from the participant was 
presented. All of these three components were best created and presented in tables as previously 
noted. 
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The participants were not compensated for participating nor did they incur any costs to 
participate in the study; furthermore, participation was completely anonymous and the captains 
were only referred to as participant followed by their number. This study had no identifying 
information for any of the guides who participated.   
A similar study from 2015 titled “Crisis Communication and Celebrity Scandal: An 
Experiment on Response Strategies” also explored Image Repair Theory and crisis response 
strategies. In the study, the primary investigator used Qualtrics to gather the pertinent data, but 
because this was a qualitative study that was guided by the philosophical perspective of 
ontology, interviews were deemed the best data gathering method. Another reason that 
interviews were chosen for this study was because they easily generate follow up questions and 
dialogue, in this case follow up questions and comments were important because of the insights 
and experiences of the guides. 
 Measures  
The study used an inductive approach to test the research questions. The participants were 
asked a number of questions, which were then coded and used to answer the research questions. 
The initial questioning also yielded follow up questions. The following is a list of the four main 
questions asked by the primary investigator: 
  What do you think about the length of time that it took BP to respond to the spill? 
 What do you think about the roles of the IGFA, CCA and FWC in the aftermath of the 
spill? 
 Do you feel that BP acted with the interests of fisherman in mind in the aftermath of the 
spill? 
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 How was the fishing impacted by the spill, was it more seen in specific species that you 
target or a broad effect on the environment?  
 
The participants’ responses were analyzed under the five strategies of Image Repair Theory; 
this analysis can be found in the results section with the associated code book and/or tables 
available in the appendices section. These five strategies are denial, evasion of responsibility, 
reducing offensiveness, corrective action and mortification.  
The first strategy, denial, contains two types: simple denial (I/ we didn’t do it) and shifting 
the blame. The second strategy, evasion of responsibility, has four types: provocation, 
defeasibility, accident, and good intentions. Reducing offensiveness has six components: 
bolstering, minimization, differentiation, transcendence, attack the accuser, and compensation. 
The fourth strategy, corrective action, is not broken down into subcategories. Rather, this is the 
organization’s attempt to fix the problem, solve the problem, or both. The fifth and final strategy 
of Benoit’s typology is mortification. Mortification takes place when everyone involved 
apologizes for the crisis (Arendt, LaFleche & Limperopulos, 2017).  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
Results 
A total of eleven in depth interviews with inshore charter fishing guides in the Tampa 
Bay Area which lasted at least one hour but not longer than two hours, were recorded, 
transcribed and put into a code book guided by Image Repair Theory. The following is the data 
that was yielded from the procedures. .  
In regards to RQ1: “How do the participants regard BP’s response strategies used in the 
aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill?” the interviews yielded the answer that the 
responses from BP were too slow, unorganized and overall not appropriate to address the 
disaster. Additionally, while the guides felt that BP was right to compensate those who were 
impacted by the spill, overall BP was insincere in their responses and the company was viewed 
as bungling.  
In regards to RQ 2: “What response strategies do participants feel should be used in 
future spills?” The interviews found that the captains felt that oil companies should use 
mortification and be clearly regretful for their actions, have clear corrective action plans laid out 
to deal with these situations and reduce offensiveness (the use of payouts to those effected as 
well as investing in the environment should be used but there should be a vetting process).  
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Analysis 
BP employed all five strategies of Image Repair Theory. Corrective action had to be 
employed in order to clean up the spill, but the use of chemical dispersants and the lack of a real 
plan of action again negatively impacted the company. Reducing offensiveness was a strategy 
that was used and had positive impacts; however it was also viewed negatively as time wore on. 
BP didn’t vet people as they should’ve been , so what was once viewed as fairly compensating 
those who were negatively impacted  by the disaster came to be viewed as throwing money at 
everyone and everything in order to make it all go away. Finally mortification was something 
that BP failed to properly employ as well; it was a failed attempt at appearing mortified and truly 
regretful for what happened.  
The following are quotes from participants regarding some of the response strategies used: 
Corrective action  
“My take on all of that… the dispersants… is that we may all die from what they did. They threw 
untested stuff in our water” - Participant six 
“I’m assuming that most of the oil sunk to great depths and was dispersed.” “I don’t know what 
the impact of that was” - Participant four  
These quote show dissatisfaction with how BP responded to the spill as far as clean-up efforts in 
corrective action.  
Reducing offensiveness,  
“The compensation was irresponsible, I feel like people who weren’t really affected were 
compensated”- Participant 10 
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“It seemed a little gimmicky to me, kind of like, “oops, let’s fix this, let’s spend some money and 
try to get everyone back on our side”- Participant 11  
These quotes show how disingenuous participants felt that the payouts that BP used as a form of 
reducing offensiveness were 
Denial   
“They didn’t want to let everyone know that there were millions of gallons spilling” – Participant 
10 
“Yeah I definitely saw denial there” – Participant 11 
These quotes show that participants felt that BP used denial as a response strategy after the spill  
Evasion of responsibility  
“I feel like they shifted the blame to other parties” – Participant one 
“I think there was blame being shifted to the blowout preventer, the manufacturer” – Participant 
10 
These quotes regarding evasion of responsibility show that participants felt that BP didn’t take 
responsibility for the spill 
Mortification 
 
BP said they cared, but they didn’t”, - Participant two  
 
“They were more worried about themselves”.  
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“I felt that it wasn’t sincere and that they didn’t care as much about the environment as they were 
trying to advertise” – Participant seven 
These quotes demonstrate how participants felt that BP wasn’t truly regretful and mortified by 
what happened 
Other salient quotes:  
“They didn’t give a shit about us, they were making millions and million and billions of dollars” 
– Participant two  
“They were negligent to allow for there to not be a plan there” – Participant three 
“I wasn’t listening to them because I didn’t trust them to begin with. They’re the ones that 
caused the problem to begin with, and with everything they said nothing was happening so I had 
no trust or belief in what they were saying” – Participant three 
“I think fishermen were forgotten and that they acted in their own interests.” 
 
“Waitresses and mechanics who weren’t effected got $50,000 checks” - Participant seven  
 
All of these quotes demonstrate that BP bungled the handling of the spill, from not having a plan, 
to appearing untrustworthy and uncaring.  
As an aside to what was learned through the research questions regarding Image Repair 
Theory, the guides felt that action plans should include working with conservation organizations 
before a spill ever even happens. Additionally it was found that in the aftermath of an oil spill, 
guides would hope to see every organization that has anything to do with fishing, from 
conservation organizations to record keeping organizations and law enforcement organizations to 
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step up and lend a hand in recovery efforts and to aid guides, fisherman and the environment in 
whatever way they can. 
An additional finding of the study was that guides responded positively in regards to the 
possibility of greater representation and a coalition of angler driven organizations to help guides 
and the environment in times of need. While there was support for the aforementioned 
organization(s) there was an air of cynicism as the guides expressed that it would be a nearly 
impossible task to accomplish.  
Another result that the study found was that the fishing in Tampa Bay was largely 
unaffected by the spill, some respondents even said that the fishing was fantastic and that they 
saw no changes at all. Tampa didn’t have oil washing up on the shores of local beaches; further 
research should be conducted from areas that had widespread oil wash-ups to see how the fishing 
and environment was impacted there.  
In sum, BP took far too long to respond to the spill and participants felt that they were not 
prepared whatsoever to handle a disaster scenario, BP’s responses were not sincere and were a 
poor attempt to save face in the wake of negligence (especially in denial, evasion of 
responsibility and mortification), even in the physical actions of corrective action, the use of 
dispersants was a point of major concern for the guides. The use of these chemicals in the water 
made many guides fearful that they could have long term health effects for the ocean. The use of 
dispersants was worrisome to guides as well because they were concerned that future generations 
wouldn’t be able to have to same fishing opportunities as they did as a result of possible damage 
done by the chemicals to the ecosystem, especially future fish stocks.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
Discussions and Conclusion 
 
The most significant findings of this study were the answers to RQ 1, how do the 
participants regard BP’s response strategies used in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill? And RQ 2, what response strategies do participants feel should be used in future spills? 
The majority of the captains felt that BP’s image repair responses were inadequate in alleviating 
the situation following the Deepwater Horizon disaster and also that in the future of oil spills oil 
companies should be clearly and genuinely mortified and have clear and decisive plans for 
correcting the situation as well as alleviating the effects of said spill on the pertinent publics.  
BP should have refrained from using certain response strategies and used others 
differently.  The use of denial and evasion of responsibility greatly hurt BP; these were strategies 
that should not have been used, as they made the company look seedy, dishonest and 
unperturbed by the disaster. If BP had not used denial and evasion of responsibility but rather 
took ownership of the spill from the beginning as well as appearing to be truly mortified rather 
than feigning regret, they would’ve been perceived less negatively. Additionally, having a clear 
and concise plan of action (corrective action) for clean-up – specifically taking measures to stop 
the spill rather than letting it spill for 84 days and doing a better job of vetting people to make 
sure that only those who were actually impacted by the spill received payments (reducing 
24 
offensiveness), then they would have been perceived more favorably. Essentially, choosing the 
right responses at the right times would have helped BP.  
Image Repair Theory and its utility and applications were at the heart of this study. This 
study added to the extensive and well documented body of literature on the theory and l served 
as a case study of its application. The Deepwater Horizon spill was the worst oil spill in U.S. 
history and surely will not be the last. Image Repair Theory’s application and the insights gained 
from the interviews should be carefully examined and considered for use in the event of future 
spills. Image Repair Theory can be thought of as a guide book of what an organization in crisis 
should do, in the case of BP and the Deepwater Horizon; it can be looked at as a guide book of 
what not to do as an organization in crisis. BP bungled the response to the spill, the strategies in 
Image Repair Theory have been laid out and there was ample literature as well as success stories 
of organizations using the strategies therein in times of crisis, yet BP either used responses they 
shouldn’t have or used responses in a poor fashion. As a result of BP’s failure to appropriately 
respond to the spill, the environment suffered, jobs and the economy suffered and they were 
viewed very negatively. From boycotts to popular culture mocking the organization and groups 
of very dissatisfied stakeholders, BP got hit with a firestorm of criticism and negative publicity.  
The feedback from the participants in this study should be taken seriously and referenced 
by future organizations in both public and private sectors. This is because guides are the eyes and 
ears on the water, nearly all of the guides that were interviewed in this study spend at least 300 
days on the water per year. Guides make their living through fishing and being out in the 
environment, if they’re not, then they’re not making money. It is a likely assertion to say that of 
those not in the scientific field, no one is more in tune with what is happening in the water and 
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marine environments than charter fishing guides, especially in Florida, a state surrounded by 
water on three sides.  
If an organization or even a government agency or official can adopt these image repair 
strategies, use them properly and learn from this and other research that presently exists, then 
when they inevitably face a crisis they will be able to navigate it and come out on the other side 
without having their image completely destroyed.  Again, this study made no hypotheses and 
didn’t claim to try and change policy or change the way that Image Repair Theory is studied, it 
just brought to light new information. Whether or not this information is referenced and put to 
use is in the hands of the reader.   
The findings of this study added to the current body of research about the BP oil spill and 
that of Image Repair Theory, but it should also be viewed as opening the door for future research 
about guides, image repair and oil spills. This study didn’t make any assumptions nor did it have 
a hypothesis, it merely presented the thoughts and opinions of an underrepresented group of 
stakeholders on an issue. These stakeholders are a very influential group and their intimate 
knowledge of the topic as well as insights that have not yet been considered in previous research 
studies. There has been much biological research about this event, but the social science research 
is lacking – the arena of the impacts that it had on guides just isn’t there. The interviewees did 
indicate that they wanted to see greater connection between science and those who make their 
livings on the water as well as a larger role of conservation based organizations; this study could 
perhaps help make inroads there.  
In conclusion, the insights and opinions of guides are very important when it comes to 
environmental issues, specifically oil spills as they tend to be catastrophic events that can have 
26 
long lasting impacts on an ecosystem. Unfortunately, the literature that currently exists grossly 
under represents them despite the fact that they’re the eyes and ears on the water when it comes 
to environmental defense. Policies of both public and private entities as well as their responses to 
environmental disasters should consider them. This study provided real data from individuals 
and their businesses that were directly impacted by the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Given the 
amount of oil rigs in the Gulf of Mexico one could argue that it isn’t a matter of if another spill 
happens, but when. Before the next spill occurs, the primary investigator suggests that policy 
makers survey charter captains and their associated organizations in order to gain a better idea of 
the course of action that they should take with oil companies in the wake of future disasters.  
Future considerations should be made to the various limitations of the study. The sample 
could have been expanded to include female guides as well as other races and ethnicities (every 
guide that was interviewed was a white male). Eleven interviews were conducted; more 
interviews could provide more data. The results of this study were not generalizable because of 
the small sample size, they are only generalizable among the small sample that was collected in 
this study, and a random sample was not used. 
As stated before, Tampa Bay didn’t see oil washing up on area beaches, this study could 
be easily replicated with other captains in other Gulf Coast regions and states who were more 
impacted by the spill and did see oil wash-ups, such as Louisiana and Texas. Tampa Bay was 
impacted much less severely than other Gulf Coast states and even other parts of Florida. This 
study should be conducted with these other captains to increase the sample size as well as 
gathering a sample that was closer to the epicenter of the event. Future studies could investigate 
offshore captains as this study only focused on inshore guides. Finally, the study was qualitative 
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in nature; quantitative studies such as surveys should also be conducted to provide different sets 
of data and more information.   
However, directions for future research go beyond broadening the demographics or 
changing the type of study from qualitative to quantitative. Situations beyond environmental 
disasters should be examined in a similar fashion to how this study was conducted. Image Repair 
Theory can be applied to both organizations and individuals, scandals from yesteryear such as 
Enron and Tylenol to more recent events such as Bill Cosby and even athletes embroiled in 
scandals involving performance enhancing drugs. Finally, the circumstances surrounding the 
Primary Investigator such as being a graduate student limited the scope of the study. Future 
research could examine crises responses in other countries and cultures to add more scholarship 
to the current body of research.  
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Appendix Two: Code Book 
 
Denial Codes 
Code Explanation  Example  
Failure to recognize older rigs 
and practices 
BP kept forging on ahead in a 
form of cognitive dissonance 
in that the same old rigs and 
parts were deemed acceptable 
“We’re not updating aged 
pipelines and delivery vehicles 
at nearly the pace they’re 
being put in” 
 
“Pipelines rupture, we know 
this is going to happen” 
   
Early denial of things being as 
bad as they were  
BP’s language essentially tried 
to placate the situation by 
denying the severity of the 
spill and its impact 
“They didn’t give a shit, they 
were making millions and 
million and billions of dollars” 
   
Willful denial of the danger of 
a spill  
BP was negligent in not 
having a corrective action 
strategy in place, this could’ve 
resulted from a denial of the 
possibility of catastrophic 
failure 
“I would say that it was 
corporate negligence”  
   
Denial of the need for a plan 
of action in case of a spill 
There seemed to be a 
disconnect between the reality 
of an aging oil rig and the 
possibility of a disaster and 
having a plan in place to deal 
with that eventuality 
“Someone screwed up and 
there was negligence” 
   
  
36 
Code Explanation Example 
Didn’t deny their 
role(s)/failures in the spill 
BP owned up to losing their 
rig and having this disaster 
happen 
“They did a good job of taking 
responsibility” 
 
Didn’t deny what was going 
on 
The magnitude of the spill 
made it impossible to deny 
“What are they going to tell 
me? There’s still oil spilling 
out, we all knew that, they had 
cameras down there showing 
it all day long” 
   
Denial of safety issues Some Gulf oil rigs are 
dilapidated and look unkempt  
“I’ve fished under those oil 
platforms and I saw some 
from BP that looked rusty, 
unkempt and unsafe.” 
   
Denial wasn’t used Denial couldn’t be used 
because of how large the 
disaster was   
 
“There was no denying it, 
everyone could see it” 
   
Denial of fault, muddled 
responses  
Didn’t have an open and 
honest dialogue about the 
incident. Passed the buck  
“As time went on, I think that 
they became more open and 
said, “we’re working on it and 
doing the best we can do” 
   
Size of the problem Initially BP used denial in 
regards to how large the spill 
was 
“They didn’t want to let 
everyone know that there were 
millions of gallons spilling” 
   
Some denial BP didn’t completely deny the 
spill or their role in it, but they 
did try to shift some of the 
blame away  
“Yeah I definitely saw denial, 
they weren’t exactly shunning 
all the blame away but there 
was something” 
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Reducing Offensiveness Codes  
 
  
Code Explanation  Example  
Felt disrespect from BP Put profits over the 
environment, paid out money 
but didn’t do enough 
“I really feel like they didn’t 
take nearly the hit that the 
environment took” 
   
Made an effort to make things 
better  
Aside from cleaning up the 
spill, BP tried to help those 
who the spill impacted  
“Yeah, I mean they tried, they 
tried to reimburse you if you 
lost business, but it was a pain 
in the ass” 
   
BP wasn’t trusted  Response messages weren’t 
even worth listening to 
because BP was seen as 
disingenuous  
“All the stuff you’d see on TV 
was just brainwashing” 
   
Responses weren’t relevant  Because oil didn’t directly 
impact the Tampa Bay Area 
directly, response strategies 
were ignored  
“It didn’t impact my business, 
life goes on, I didn’t pay much 
attention; but I do feel that 
their payouts were huge” 
   
Actions of BP were more 
important than words 
The messages from BP were 
ignored, but the physical 
actions, particularly the 
payouts given by BP were 
seen as good 
“I think that it was pretty 
generous and pretty fair” 
 
“I honestly didn’t pay a whole 
lot of attention to what they 
were saying” 
   
BP wasn’t serious in their 
responses  
Compensation was seen as 
adequate, but overall BP was 
seen as unmoved 
“It sounded like those who 
had real claims were fairly 
compensated” 
 
“If they went out of their way 
to do more things and show 
that they cared… I just didn’t 
see them do that” 
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Code Explanation  Example  
BP didn’t care about the 
fishing community 
Lost compensation claims, 
huge payouts to those who 
were seen as undeserving  
“I think fisherman were 
forgotten and that they acted 
in their own interests”  
 
“Waitresses and mechanics 
who weren’t effected got 
$50,000 checks 
 
“I would put in these 
applications for money and 
then once or twice they lost it, 
I received zero compensation” 
   
BP’s response strategies for 
reducing offensiveness were 
viewed positively  
Messages were ignored 
because of the spills lack of 
saliency. Compensation 
viewed positively  
“I’ll be honest with you; I 
didn’t pay much attention to 
what they were saying. I was 
fishing and they paid me off” 
   
Reducing offensiveness 
response strategies were 
irresponsible  
Just throwing money around 
when it could have been spent 
in better ways 
“The compensation was 
irresponsible, I feel like 
people who weren’t really 
effected were compensated” 
 
“I’m not criticizing them for 
spending that money, but it 
could’ve been better invested 
in shoreline restoration” 
   
BP acted slowly but once 
things progressed, some 
actions were viewed favorably  
Plans and coordinated 
messages took time to 
organize, compensation was 
fair 
“It took a while to get the ball 
rolling and for them to realize 
that all hands on deck were 
needed” 
 
“I think that they did a decent 
job with payouts and reducing 
offensiveness”  
   
BP wasn’t seen as genuine  Reducing offensiveness 
response strategies were more 
for show than anything else 
“It seemed a little gimmicky 
to me, kind of like, “oops, 
let’s fix this, let’s spend some 
money and try to get everyone 
back on our side” 
 
 
39 
Corrective Action Codes 
 
Code Explanation  Example  
Need for better corrective 
action responses 
Slow responses to the spill, no 
course of action.  
“we should’ve had a plan in 
place to take care of this” 
   
Need long term and tried/true 
solutions 
Corrective action only to 
alleviate the current situation 
“I mean if you go out into the 
Gulf right now, who knows 
how much oil has settled on 
the bottom” 
   
Need more overall corrective 
action 
Actions didn’t go far enough  “I’m not really sure that they 
did enough; I think they could 
always do more” 
   
Distrust of corrective actions 
taken 
Chemical dispersants being 
used was seen as a negative 
move by BP 
“I’m assuming that most of 
the oil sunk to great depths 
and was dispersed.” “I don’t 
know what the impact of that 
was”.  
   
Need faster response time BP didn’t react fast enough to 
the spill 
“I definitely think that it was 
lengthy, I feel like it was 
devastating by the time that 
anybody had really addressed 
it and it was pretty bad” 
   
Concern for future generations Chemical dispersants seen as 
dangerous  
“we may all die from what 
they did, they threw untested 
stuff in our water” 
   
Unprepared, no plans for spill Did not seem ready to deal 
with a spill 
“It seemed like they didn’t 
have a plan of action” 
   
Adequate responses  Not fast enough but okay 
response 
“I think that they corrected 
things as much as they could” 
   
Acceptable responses Actions were deemed 
adequate 
“I mean they spent a lot of 
money and effort” 
   
Had to limit damage Not exactly sure of processes 
involved in clean up 
“You have to minimize the 
damage as much as you can” 
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Code Explanation  Example  
No real plan Lack of quick action 
endangered future fish stocks  
“It seemed like there was no 
direct plan of action right 
away” 
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Evasion of Responsibility Codes 
 
Code Explanation  Example  
Shifted the blame BP didn’t take responsibility 
for what happened  
“I feel like they shifted the 
blame to other parties”  
   
Didn’t issue real and 
meaningful statements that 
would tie them to the situation 
BP tried to distance 
themselves from what 
happened by not addressing 
the issue as best they could 
“I mean it was all bullshit, 
they told us what we wanted 
to hear so that they could keep 
doing what they were doing 
before” 
   
Didn’t adequately address the 
spill in any fashion (physical 
or otherwise) 
BP tried to separate 
themselves from the spill as 
much as possible 
“They just wanted it all to 
disappear from our eyes and 
from the media” 
   
Focused attention on an 
improperly installed piece of 
equipment  
BP wanted people to know 
that a specific piece of 
equipment installed by a third 
party broke  
“I do remember something 
about the installation not being 
quite right and I can’t 
remember them saying that it 
wasn’t a problem” 
   
Through corrective action and 
reducing offensiveness BP 
took responsibility  
By cleaning up the spill and 
paying out millions to those 
effected by the spill BP took 
responsibility for their actions 
“I think that they did a good 
job of taking responsibility” 
   
Adequately took responsibility 
for the spill  
After the spill BP did respond 
and owned it but not enough 
“They were kind of blasé.” 
   
Took adequate ownership of 
the spill  
Didn’t try to shift the blame, 
but didn’t use enough 
corrective action, which was 
the true mark of ownership 
“They took ownership and 
responsibility but could have 
done more” 
   
Took responsibility for the 
spill 
Didn’t pass the buck at all “I don’t think that I ever heard 
them say, “it’s your fault not 
ours”, it’s been a while but I 
don’t seem to remember that” 
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Code Explanation  Example  
BP owned the spill BP didn’t try to put the blame 
on anyone else  
“I feel like they owned it. I 
mean I didn’t think that they 
pushed it on anyone else or 
anything like that” 
   
BP blamed someone else for 
the disaster 
BP put the blame on the 
manufacturer of the blowout 
preventer 
“I think there was blame being 
shifted to the blowout 
preventer, the manufacturer”  
   
Tried to create distance 
between the company and the 
disaster 
Didn’t deny that the spill was 
happening but tried to get 
away from the disaster 
“I think that BP was kind of 
not shunning blame away, but 
there was something” 
 
“Like evasion of 
responsibility” 
 
“Right” 
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Mortification Codes 
Code Explanation  Example  
Expressed mortification that 
was insincere  
BP’s guilt in the wake of the 
spill was more for show than 
anything else; to keep their 
doors open 
“I feel that their primary focus 
and concern was dollars” 
   
BP wasn’t truly mortified at 
all 
BP said and did what was 
necessary to make themselves 
seem less like the “bad guy” 
“BP said they cared, but they 
didn’t”  
 
“They were more worried 
about themselves” 
   
Mortification messages that 
weren’t trusted 
BP wasn’t trusted and their 
messages fell on deaf ears 
“I had no trust or belief in 
what they were saying” 
   
Unclear if BP was mortified or 
not 
Because of the disorganization 
of response strategies, it was 
difficult to ascertain BP’s 
intent and beliefs  
“I don’t really remember a 
specific, consistent message” 
   
Mortified out of necessity  BP expressed regret, but they 
were doing so to appease the 
public 
“I think that they were really 
only just trying to cover their 
asses” 
   
No mortification BP didn’t seem to be mortified 
at all 
“It sounded like they were just 
doing their jobs and it was a 
regular day” 
   
BP didn’t care about the 
effects of the spill 
All of the messages and 
dialogue mortification wise 
were only for show 
“I felt that it wasn’t sincere 
and that they didn’t care as 
much about the environment 
as they were trying to 
advertise” 
   
BP was honestly mortified  A spill is the worst thing that 
can happen to an oil company, 
the magnitude of this spill 
reinforced their mortification  
“I think that they were pretty 
well distressed, no oil 
company wants a rig to blow 
up” 
   
Adequately mortified  The spill was an absolute 
catastrophe and BP was 
embarrassed and seemed 
remorseful about it 
“I think that they were pretty 
mortified, with a spill that big, 
how much more could they 
have done?” 
   
44 
Code Explanation  Example  
Not known for sure if BP was 
in fact mortified or not 
There is no way to know for 
sure if words mean what the 
people saying them actually 
mean 
“It’s a hard call, they may 
have just put on a face” 
   
Dishonestly mortified Because of public reactions to 
the spill BP used mortification 
strategies  
“It seemed like it may have 
been a little bit forced or that 
they got a slap on the wrist 
and said, “I’m sorry”.” 
 
